Hussein Al-Sheikh in an Interview with Al-Arabiya: A Reading of the Political Psychology of the Discourse and Messages of the Next Phase by Dr. Abdul Karim Abu Mustafa
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Israel on the Brink of a War Decision: Netanyahu and Eizenkot in a Power Struggle... and Iran at the Heart of Regional Calculations
Israel on the Brink of a War Decision: Netanyahu and Eizenkot in a Power Struggle... and Iran at the Heart of Regional Calculations A Reading in Political Psychology and the Interplay of National Security with the Battle of Forming the Israeli Government By: Dr. Abdul Karim Abu Mustafa The issue in Israel is no longer merely a disagreement over the timing of a military strike against Iran, nor just a divergence in the military establishment's assessments regarding the level of the Iranian threat. We are faced with a more complex scene where war calculations intertwine with power struggles, and security considerations are entangled with constitutional obligations, while Washington turns into a decisive factor in determining the direction of the upcoming confrontation. On November 12, 2026, political and security developments revealed a striking paradox: Israel is raising its readiness level for the possibility of renewed war with Iran, while the military establishment, according to Channel 13, sees no urgent necessity for an immediate Israeli attack, preferring to join any American military operation if President Donald Trump decides to carry it out. At the same time, the crisis of forming the government continues, after Gadi Eizenkot was tasked with forming the new Israeli government, while Benjamin Netanyahu continues to head the caretaker government and retains the powers to manage the security and military establishment. This is not just a temporal coincidence; it is a moment where three existential questions intersect: Who rules Israel? Who has the decision for war? And can regional escalation be utilized to rearrange the internal political power balances? First: Netanyahu... Between Decision Authority and Pressures of Political Transition Benjamin Netanyahu faces an exceptional political situation. He is still the head of the government, but he no longer holds the parliamentary majority that allows him to continue ruling according to the new Knesset balances. In contrast, Gadi Eizenkot has been tasked with forming the government after his supporting camp received recommendations from 67 members, compared to 46 for Netanyahu, according to the data that followed the Israeli elections on October 27. Eizenkot has an initial constitutional deadline of 28 days, with the possibility of extending it for an additional 14 days, to form a coalition that enjoys the confidence of the Knesset. Here the dilemma appears: Netanyahu possesses the powers of the existing government, while Eizenkot is working to build the next government. This overlap between the existing authority and the authority seeking to arrive creates an extremely sensitive space, especially when it comes to military decisions that could lead to regional war. From the perspective of political psychology, this situation can be read through the concept of power struggle in the transitional phase; the ability of political leadership to maneuver in the Knesset diminishes, while it still retains the tools of executive and security authority. Here the question becomes related to the limits of using powers during the transitional phase, not just who legally possesses them. Second: Eizenkot... The Battle for Oversight on the War Decision Gadi Eizenkot's move was not merely a political objection to Netanyahu, but was linked to the demand for regular security briefings and ensuring institutional oversight on military decisions during the government formation phase. Eizenkot demanded the legal advisor's intervention to ensure he receives security briefings and warned against executing military operations that are not imposed by an immediate and urgent security necessity, due to the potential repercussions on Israeli democracy and public trust in state institutions. Netanyahu responded by accusing him of politicizing security issues, asserting that his government's decisions are based on security considerations and coordination with the military establishment. On November 12, the two parties held a security and political meeting that lasted more than two hours, attended by the military secretary to the Prime Minister, and they agreed to continue exchanging security briefings and updates. However, the significance of the meeting goes beyond its protocol image; the presence of a transitional Prime Minister and a party leader tasked with forming the next government in a security briefing session reflects the sensitivity of the phase and the limits of trust between the two sides of the political equation. Moreover, Avigdor Lieberman's warnings against making decisions that could lead to war without parliamentary oversight and broad security consensus indicate that the issue is no longer a bilateral disagreement between Netanyahu and Eizenkot, but has become a broader discussion about the legitimacy of the security decision during the transitional phase. Third: Iran... Military Preparedness Without an Announced Necessity for Immediate Attack Iran seems to be at the heart of this equation. According to what was reported by the Israeli Broadcasting Authority "Kan", directives were issued to the military establishment to raise the level of readiness for scenarios related to a potential confrontation with Iran. In contrast, Channel 12 reported that the security establishment does not see in the current Iranian movements any justification for launching an immediate attack at the current political timing. Channel 13 reported that the army's position presented to Netanyahu and Eizenkot is that there is no urgent necessity for a unilateral Israeli attack, preferring Israel's participation if the United States decides to carry out a military operation against Tehran. These data reveal the necessity to distinguish between three levels: 1. Military readiness: raising readiness and preparedness for confrontation possibilities. 2. Operational assessment: determining whether there is a threat that necessitates an immediate military strike. 3. Political decision: determining the timing of war, its scope, and the parties involved. The three levels may coincide without necessarily meaning that a decision for war has been made. From here, the importance of the American position emerges. The Israeli military establishment, according to the narrative conveyed by Channel 13, does not treat any new confrontation as necessarily an Israeli operation alone, but places American participation at the core of its calculations. This reflects the extent of Israeli reliance on the American umbrella in managing major strategic confrontations, especially when the possibilities of Iranian retaliation and the widening scope of war are present in military assessments. Fourth: Trump... The Party That May Determine the Ceiling of Confrontation The Israeli calculations cannot be understood in isolation from Washington. The American position is not limited to providing military and political support to Israel, but extends to influencing the timing of operations, their limits, and their regional costs. International reports circulate American messages urging Israel and Gulf states to prepare for the possibility of renewed war with Iran. However, readiness does not mean that a final American decision for confrontation has been issued. Here lies the paradox: Israel may wish to retain the military option, but it cannot ignore the cost of confrontation if it does not have American participation or a clear strategic umbrella. As for Trump, he finds himself facing intertwined options between political pressure, sanctions, negotiations, and military threats. Thus, the question is not only whether Washington will participate in the war, but to what extent it is prepared to bear its regional consequences, and whether it sees that military confrontation achieves objectives that other pressure tools cannot. Fifth: Turkey and Greece... The Eastern Mediterranean Enters the Calculations Alongside the tension with Iran, developments in the Eastern Mediterranean emerge as an additional pathway in Israeli security calculations. Military cooperation between Israel and Greece, and their joint naval exercises, reflect the continued building of security partnerships in a region witnessing escalating competition for influence, maritime passages, and energy resources. Moreover, the tension related to the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement adds another dimension to regional competition. Here, these developments should be viewed within a broader context: Israel does not deal with its security solely through the Iranian front, but within a network of balances that includes Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, and the United States. However, these pathways should not be conflated; Israeli-Greek cooperation does not necessarily imply a decision to open a military confrontation with Turkey, nor do military exercises alone represent evidence of an intention for war. They are indicators of rearranging partnerships and deterrence balances in a region where strategic competition is increasing. Sixth: Could Iran Be a Gateway to Change the Israeli Political Equation? This is the most sensitive point in the scene. From the perspective of political psychology, the behavior of the parties can be explained through three concepts: 1. Aversion to Political Loss: When a politician feels that their position is threatened, the potential loss becomes more present in their calculations than future gains. This may affect how they deal with crises and external threats. 2. Uniting the Group Against External Threat: Historically, external threats may lead to strengthening the rally around leadership, temporarily diminishing internal disagreements. However, this effect is not guaranteed, especially when trust in institutions and leadership is in dispute. 3. Crisis of Legitimacy and Institutional Trust: When the military establishment and political leadership disagree on the timing of using force, the military decision becomes a test of the relationship between authority, oversight, and national responsibility. From this standpoint, it cannot be asserted that Netanyahu seeks war for electoral or personal reasons, but it is legitimate to analyze the potential impact of escalation on his political position, on the negotiations for forming the government, and on Eizenkot's ability to complete his mission. War may postpone political disagreements, accelerate consensus on an emergency government, and conversely deepen internal division if its costs become a political burden on the existing leadership. Seventh: Three Scenarios for the Future of Government Formation In light of these data, three political pathways can be envisioned: Scenario One: Forming an Expanded Government or Emergency Government. Fears of renewed war with Iran may push political forces to transcend their disagreements and form a government that grants security decisions broader political cover and distributes responsibility for the upcoming phase. Scenario Two: Freezing Government Negotiations. The escalation of military risks may slow negotiations, lead to a reevaluation of alliances, and await clarification of the American and Iranian positions before entering into long-term governmental understandings. Scenario Three: Continuing the Power Struggle in Parallel with Negotiations. This means Netanyahu continues to manage the government and security agencies, alongside Eizenkot's attempts to form the new coalition, with escalating debate over the limits of the transitional government's powers and parliamentary oversight on war decisions. This scenario places Israeli institutions before a constitutional and political test, especially since forming the government does not necessarily stop with the end of regional tensions. Eighth: What Do These Developments Mean for Gaza? Gaza cannot be outside these calculations. Any new Israeli escalation towards Iran may rearrange Israeli military and security priorities and affect the nature of managing other fronts, including Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. However, this does not necessarily mean that escalation with Iran will lead to a reduction of operations in Gaza; Israel may seek to distribute its military efforts, or attempt to manage multiple fronts in parallel, or use regional escalation to change negotiation and pressure priorities. For the Gaza Strip, the continued state of Israeli political and security uncertainty places the future of administrative, humanitarian arrangements, and reconstruction before additional challenges. The decisions made by the Israeli leadership regarding Iran are not confined to the limits of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation, but their effects can extend to the entire region, including the lives of Palestinians and the future of the Gaza Strip. Conclusion: The Struggle is Not Only for War... But for Who Holds Its Decision What is happening in Israel today reveals an unusual intertwining between the crisis of forming the government and the decision for war, and between national security calculations and competition for power. Netanyahu still possesses the tools of governance, Eizenkot has the mandate to form the government, and the military establishment is raising its level of readiness, but it does not announce, according to the conveyed reports, the necessity for an immediate Israeli attack on Iran, while Washington remains an influential factor in determining the direction of the confrontation. In contrast, Israel operates within a more complex regional environment, where Iran, Gaza, Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean intertwine, and the difficulty of separating military deterrence from political bargaining increases. In my opinion, the essence of the current Israeli moment lies not only in the possibility of a new war with Iran but in the crisis of decision-making within Israel: Can security and political institutions separate the strategic interest of the state from the calculations of the power struggle? War may be a military decision at a certain moment, but in this case, it also carries constitutional, political, and regional dimensions. The question that will determine the direction of the next phase is not only: Will Israel strike Iran? But: Will the decision for war remain a security decision governed by threat assessments and strategic interest, or will it turn into a card in the battle for reshaping power within Israel? That is the question we should monitor, as it may reveal much about the future of confrontation in the region, and about the pathways awaiting Gaza, Iran, and the Eastern Mediterranean in the next phase.