The Palestine Liberation Organization: In the Circle of External Targeting and Internal Erosion

Five years ago, I wrote two consecutive articles in the "Al-Ittihad" newspaper regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the first titled "The PLO and the Difficult Challenges," and the second "The PLO Between Renewal and Reconstruction." At that time, the concern revolved around the weakening, marginalization, and decline of the organization’s role, coinciding with external attempts, particularly during President Trump's first term, to undermine its status as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. Today, after the dangerous transformations that the Palestinian cause has witnessed, the fears expressed back then seem more urgent. The targeting of the PLO has not diminished; rather, it has taken on more complex forms, at a time when the Palestinian national cause itself is subjected to attempts at redefinition, fragmentation, and circumvention, making the defense of the organization and restoring its status, indeed saving it from what is being plotted in dark rooms, part of the battle to protect the entire Palestinian national project. Since its establishment and the building of its institutions in the mid-1960s, the PLO has been more than just a political framework. It has restored the Palestinian people's presence on the political map, transformed the refugee issue into that of a people struggling for return, self-determination, and independence, and has become the unifying framework for Palestinians both at home and in the diaspora, carrying their cause to various Arab and international forums, in addition to being part of the rising Arab and global liberation movements at that time. At a time when Palestine was almost reduced to a refugee issue, the organization succeeded in re-presenting the Palestinian as the owner of a cause and national rights, and in extracting increasing global recognition of the Palestinian people and their rights. Thus, targeting the organization is not merely an attack on a transient administrative or political institution, but rather an assault on the framework that embodied the political and national unity of the Palestinian people and preserved it over decades. However, the danger did not come solely from the outside. Internal factors have contributed to weakening the organization, especially since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority after the Oslo Agreement, when the roles of the Authority began to overlap with those of the organization, and the Authority and its institutions gradually began to monopolize political, media, and international attention, while the presence of the organization and its institutions receded. Over time, the marginalization affected the organization’s institutions, the role of the National Council, the Central Council, the Executive Committee, and the popular unions diminished, and the connection with the Palestinian people in the diaspora eroded. Additionally, exclusivity, bureaucracy, and the decline of democratic life weakened its ability to perform the role for which it was created. Attempts to seek alternatives to the PLO are not new; their signs began to emerge in the mid-1980s, in various regional and international political contexts, but our people thwarted those attempts with determination and resilience, clinging to the organization as a unifying national framework and the sole legitimate representative of their cause. In light of the rising campaigns questioning the organization and its singular representation of the Palestinian people, and with the division, the pace of skepticism and attempts to form alternatives has risen again. It was a mistake to treat the organization as if the establishment of the Authority had ended its function. The Authority was a product of a decision by the PLO, not a substitute for it, while the organization remained the unifying political framework for all Palestinians, both at home and in the diaspora, responsible for their national cause and political future. Today, amid the war on our people, the escalation of displacement and settlement plans, attempts at annexation, and the liquidation of the two-state solution, as well as attempts to separate the West Bank from Gaza, and the marginalization of the independent Palestinian role in shaping the future of the cause, preserving the PLO becomes more important than ever. This matter does not concern Palestine alone. There is a broader international and regional trend towards settling accounts with national liberation movements in various ways and means, through gateways that may seem superficially enticing and carry titles of renewal, reform, and democracy, while in some cases they may conceal objectives that go beyond their surface to reshape the political scene in a way that serves other projects. In this context, serious attention should be paid to attempts to bypass the PLO or to empty its representation of its substance. However, confronting this danger cannot be achieved by defending the organization’s status quo. The organization needs protection through its reform and renewal, to regain its status by rebuilding its institutions on democratic and representative foundations, involving various political and social forces, enhancing the presence of youth and women, and restoring the importance of popular unions and Palestinian communities in the diaspora. What is required is not to entrench around the organization in its current reality, nor to fall into the trap of dangerous enticement, but rather to first activate its institutions, restore the Executive Committee to its role as a supreme political reference, reinstate the National Council and the Central Council, activate the organization’s circles, embassies, and institutions, and rebuild the relationship with millions of Palestinians in the diaspora, whose cause should not become a margin in the Palestinian political system. Then comes the most important step: renewing the organization democratically, through elections for the National Council as the highest legislative body for the Palestinian people, with elections in the interior being part of this comprehensive national process, not a substitute for it or a bridge to circumvent the PLO or encroach on its representative role. From here, any anticipated electoral path should be read in its broader political context, and the cautions I previously pointed out in earlier articles should be taken seriously, so that elections do not, intentionally or unintentionally, turn from a tool for renewing Palestinian political life into an entry point for reshaping the political system within ceilings and arrangements that do not necessarily respond to the requirements of rebuilding the unified national representation. Here, specifically, caution should be exercised regarding certain paths that may don the guise of enticement, renewal, and democracy, while in essence leading to the weakening of the unifying national framework or bypassing it. True renewal does not begin with marginalizing the PLO or reducing Palestinian representation to institutions or elections governed by specific contexts, but rather begins with restoring the organization’s importance, activating its institutions, and renewing its legitimacy on democratic and representative foundations, so that elections become a means to restore the unity of the Palestinian political system, not an entry point for dismantling or reshaping it away from its national reference. Moreover, the reform of the organization must be accompanied by a national agreement on a clear political strategy that protects the established national rights, foremost among them the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, the right of refugees to return, the unity of the Palestinian people and the unity of their political territories, and their right to resist occupation in accordance with international law. The PLO does not belong to a faction, leadership, or a specific generation. It belongs to the entire Palestinian people, and it is the fruit of the struggles and sacrifices of successive generations. Therefore, defending it does not mean defending its mistakes or its current reality, but rather defending its historical and national necessity, and working to save it from internal erosion and external targeting together. Five years ago, I called for activating the organization and renewing its structure, and I said that the task is difficult but possible if sincere political will is available. Today, this task seems more urgent, because delay no longer means just the continuation of weakness, but opens the door to other projects seeking to bypass the unified Palestinian national representation and reshape the cause in a way that aligns with the interests of others. The PLO needs real salvation, not celebratory statements, and a national partnership, not guardianship, and democracy, not quotas, and the renewal of its institutions, not merely recycling them. Protecting the organization is essentially protecting the unity of the Palestinian people, their cause, and their rights. At this difficult historical moment, the question is no longer: Do we need the PLO? But rather: Do we have the will to preserve it, strengthen it, and rebuild its institutions, as our people need in their long struggle for freedom, independence, and return? The answer to this question cannot be postponed any longer.